

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has already been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc No. 5]. While the Court found Plaintiff's original Complaint required sua sponte dismissal without service pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, it determined that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint sufficient to survive screening, and thus, issued a summons and directed the United States Marshal to effect service of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint upon all Defendants on February 27, 2007 pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) [Doc. No. 10].

Now, almost a year later, Plaintiff has managed to effect service as to the majority of Defendants, and they have moved to dismiss his Amended Complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 28]. That Motion has been referred to and remains pending before Honorable Magistrate Judge Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b)(1)(B) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 72.3. In the meantime, however, Plaintiff has been unable to successfully effect service via the U.S. Marshal upon Defendants M.E. Bourland, J. Dovery, D. Sawtell, V. Kilpa and M. Zendejas, despite two attempts to do so. See Doc. Nos. 13-14, 17-18, 33-37.

On May 25, 2007, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for an Extension of Time to Effect Service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m) [Doc. No. 29]. In that Order, the Court noted and discussed why Plaintiff's initial attempts at serving each of these individual defendants were unsuccessful, directed the Clerk to provide him with 5 additional blank U.S. Marshal Form 285s and found good cause to extend Rule 4's 120-day clock in order for him correct his service errors. As to Defendant M.E. Bourland, the Warden at Calipatria State Prison at the time Plaintiff's cause of action accrued, but whom had since retired, the Court went further and directed the Deputy Attorney General to provide the U.S. Marshal with his forwarding address in a confidential memorandum. See May 25, 2007 Order [Doc No. 29] at 6-7.

Service as Bourland remains unexecuted. In addition, service remains unexecuted as to Dovery, Sawtell, Kilpa and Zendejas because Plaintiff attempted to serve them *not* by providing the Marshal with each defendant's name and address where they could be located, but rather, by simply addressing his new Form 285s to "Tiffany Hixon @ Attorney General's Office." [Doc. Nos. 33-37].

 Ms. Hixon, the Deputy Attorney General currently representing the properly served defendants in this case, returned each Form 285 to the U.S. Marshal on June 21, 2006–with a memoranda stating:

Plaintiff, William Jones, in pro per prison inmate has attempted to serve Defendants Sawtell, Kilpa, Dovery, Bourland, and Zendejas in care of me at my office. I cannot accept service on behalf of these individuals. None of these individuals have requested representation form our office. As such, I do not represent them and cannot accept service on their behalf.

Id. In addition, however, Deputy Attorney General Hixon has indicated in a footnote included in her Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38 at 1 n.1], that she has "provided the U.S. Marshalls [sic] with a confidential memorandum containing the address of Defendant Bourland." *Id.*

Thus, to date, no proof of service has been filed as to any of these defendants. *See Walker v. Sumner*, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1994) (where a pro se plaintiff fails to provide the Marshal with sufficient information to effect service, the court's sua sponte dismissal of those unserved defendants is appropriate under FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m)). While it is not clear why the U.S. Marshal has yet to effect service upon Defendant M.E. Bourland at the confidential address the Attorney General's Office has been ordered to, and apparently already has provided, it is also unclear why Plaintiff has failed to correct his error in attempting to effect service upon the remaining Defendants via the Attorney General.

Specifically, Plaintiff was put on notice that his attempt to serve Defendants Sawtell, Kilpa, Dovery and Zendejas via the Deputy Attorney General was insufficient when Deputy Attorney General Hixon returned his USM Form 285s to the U.S. Marshal with her memoranda dated June 21, 2007, and the U.S. Marshal returned those attempts at service unexecuted on June 22, 2007 [Doc. Nos. 33-36]. Inexplicably, Plaintiff has failed to correct this new defect. *See Rochon v. Dawson*, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that plaintiff "may not remain silent and do nothing to effectuate" U.S. Marshal service, but rather "[a]t a minimum ... attempt to remedy any apparent defects [about] which [he] has knowledge.").

Conclusion and Order 1 2 Accordingly, the Court hereby: 3 (1) REDIRECTS the United States Marshal to effect service of the summons and 4 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint upon defendant M.E. Bourland at the address included in 5 the confidential memorandum previously provided by the Attorney General pursuant to 28 6 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2), and to file proof of service upon Defendant 7 Bourland no later than February 22, 2008; and 8 (2) ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause no later than February 22, 2008, why this case 9 should not be dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.4(m) as to Defendants D. Sawtell, V. Kilpa, J. Dovery and M. Zendejas. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 **DATED:** January 28, 2008 13 Cam A. Burn 14 15 HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS **United States District Judge** 16 17 18 19 20

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While *proof of service* upon Defendant Bourland *must* be filed, the Court's May 25, 2007 admonition remains in effect: "Defendant Bourland's address *shall not* appear on any U.S. Marshal Form 285, *shall not* be provided to Plaintiff, and shall not be made part of the Court's record." *See* May 25, 2007 Order [Doc. No. 29] at 7 n.2. In *Graham v. Satkoski*, 51 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit specifically noted that "prisoners often get the 'runaround' when they attempt to obtain information through governmental channels and [encounter] needless attendant delays in litigating a case [as a] result." *Id.* at 713. However, while a "state prison official may be justifiably reluctant to provide employee addresses to a prisoner ... due to security concerns, it can hardly claim the same reluctance in providing the information to a federal law enforcement agency." *Id.*